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Abstract
We consider the static and dynamic models of Cournot duopoly with tax evasion.
In the dynamic model we introduce the time delay and we analyze the local stability
of the stationary state. There is a critical value of the delay when the Hopf bifurcation
occurs.
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1 Introduction
During the last decades revenues from indirect tax have become increasingly important
in many economies. Substantial attention has been devoted to evasion of indirect taxes. It
is well known that indirect tax evasion, especially evasion of VAT, may erode a substantial
part of tax revenues [2], [4], [5].
In [3] a model with tax evasion is presented. The authors consider n firms which enter
the market with a homogenous good. These firms have to pay an ad valorem sales tax, but
may evade a certain amount of their tax duty. The aims of the firms are to maximize their
profits. The equilibrium point is determined and an economic analysis is made.
Based on [1], [3], [7], [8], [10], in our paper we present three economic models with tax
evasion: the static model of Cournot duopoly with tax evasion in Section 2, the dynamic
model of Cournot duopoly with tax evasion in Section 3 and the dynamic model with tax
evasion and time delay in Section 4.
In Section 2, in the static model the purpose of the firms is to maximize their profits.
We determine the firms’ outputs and the declared revenues which maximize the profits, as
well as the conditions for the model’s parameters in which the maxim profits are obtained.
Using Maple 11, the variables orbits are displayed.
In Section 3, the dynamic model describes the variation in time of the firms’ outputs
and the declared revenues. We study the local stability for the stationary state and the
conditions under which it is asymptotically stable.
In Section 4, we formulate a new dynamic model, based on the model from Section 3,
in which the time delay is introduced. That means, the two firms do not enter the market
1
2at the same time. One of them is the leader firm and the other is the follower firm. The
second one knows the leader’s output in the previous moment t− τ, τ ≥ 0.
Using classical methods [6], [9] we investigate the local stability of the stationary state by
analyzing the corresponding transcendental characteristic equation of the linearized system.
By choosing the delay as a bifurcation parameter we show that this model exhibits a limit
cycle.
Finally numerical simulations, some conclusions and future research possibilities are of-
fered.
2 The static model of Cournot duopoly with tax evasion
The static model of Cournot duopoly is described by an economic game, where two firms
enter the market with a homogenous consumption product. The elements which describe
the model are: the quantities which enter the market from the two firms xi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2; the
declared revenues zi, i = 1, 2; the inverse demand function p : R+ → R+ ( p is a derivable
function with p′ (x) < 0, lim
x→a1
p (x) = 0, lim
x→0
p (x) = b1,
(
a1 ∈ R, b1 ∈ R
)
; the penalty function
F : R+ → R+ (F is a derivable function with F
′ (x) > 0, F ′′ (x) > 0, F (0) = 0); the cost
functions Ci : R+ → R+ ( Ci are derivable functions with C
′
i (xi) > 0, C
′′
i ≥ 0, i = 1, 2 ).
The government levies an ad valorem tax on each firm’s sales at the rate t1 ∈ (0, 1) and
q ∈ [0, 1] is the probability with which the tax evasion is detected.
The true tax base of firm i is xip (x1 + x2) . Firm i declares zi ≤ xip (x1 + x2) as tax base
to the tax authority. Accordingly, evaded revenues of firm i are given by xip (x1 + x2)− zi.
With probability 1− q tax evasion remains undetected and the tax bill of firm i amounts to
t1zi. The tax authority detects tax evasion of firm i with probability q. In case of detection,
firm i has to pay taxes on the full amount of revenues, xip (x1 + x2) , and, in addition, a
penalty F (xip (x1 + x2)− zi). The penalty is increasing and convex in evaded revenues
xip (x1 + x2) − zi. Moreover, it is assumed that F (0) = 0, namely law-abiding firms go
unpunished.
The profit functions of the two firms are: Pi : R
2
+ → R+, i = 1, 2, given by:
Pi = Pi (x1, x2, z1, z2) = (1− q) [xip (x1 + x2)− Ci (xi)− t1zi] +
q [(1− t1)xip (x1 + x2)− Ci (xi)− F (xip (x1 + x2)− zi)] . (1)
The first bracketed term in (1) equals the profit of firm i if evasion activities remain unde-
tected. The second term in (1) represents the profit of firm i in case tax evasion is detected.
The firm’s aim is to maximize (1) with respect to output xi and declared revenues zi.
This aim represents a mathematical optimization problem which is given by:
max
{xi,zi}
Pi, i = 1, 2. (2)
From the hypothesis about the functions p, F, Ci, i = 1, 2 , we have:
Proposition 1 The solution of problem (2) is given by the solution of the following system:
∂Pi
∂xi
= [1− qt1 − qF
′ (xip (x1 + x2)− zi)] [p (x1 + x2) + xip
′ (x1 + x2)]− Ci (xi) = 0
∂Pi
∂zi
= − (1− q) t1 + qF
′ (xip (x1 + x2)− zi) = 0, i = 1, 2. (3)
3In what follows, we will consider the penalty function F (x) =
1
2
st1x
2, s ≥ 1, the cost
functions Ci (xi) = cixi, ci > 0, i = 1, 2 and the price function p (x) =
1
x
.
From (3) we can deduce:
Proposition 2 If
1− q
qs+ q − 1
c1 ≤ c2 ≤
qs+ q − 1
1− q
c1, then the solution of system (3) is
given by :
x∗1 =
c2 (1− t1)
(c1 + c2)
2
, x∗2 =
c1 (1− t1)
(c1 + c2)
2
,
z∗1 =
c2
c1 + c2
−
1− q
qs
, z∗2 =
c1
c1 + c2
−
1− q
qs
. (4)
For the parameters c1 = 0.3, c2 = 0.6, q = 0.12, t1 = 0.16, the variations of the variables
z1, z2, and the profits P1, P2 are given in the following figures:
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3 The dynamic model of Cournot duopoly with tax eva-
sion
The dynamic model describes the variation in time of output xi (t) , i = 1, 2 taking into
account the marginal profits
∂Pi
∂xi
, i = 1, 2. Assume that each agent adjusts its declared
revenue zi (t), i = 1, 2 proportionally to the marginal profits
∂Pi
∂zi
, i = 1, 2. Then, the
4dynamic model is given by the following differential system of equations:
·
xi (t) = ki
∂Pi
∂xi
= ki{[1− qt1 − qF
′ (xip (x1 + x2)− zi)] ·
[p (x1 + x2) + xip
′ (x1 + x2)]− Ci (xi)}, (5)
·
zi (t) = hi
∂Pi
∂zi
= hi [− (1− q) t1 + qF
′ (xip (x1 + x2)− zi)] , i = 1, 2
with the initial conditions xi (0) = xi0, zi (0) = zi0, i = 1, 2 and hi > 0, ki > 0, i = 1, 2.
For F (x) =
1
2
st1x
2, s ≥ 1 and Ci (xi) = cixi, ci > 0, i = 1, 2 system (5) becomes :
·
x1 (t) = k1{[1− qt1 − qst1 (x1 (t) p (x1 (t) + x2 (t))− z1 (t))] ·
· [p (x1 (t) + x2 (t)) + x1 (t) p
′ (x1 (t) + x2 (t))]− c1}
·
x2 (t) = k2{[1− qt1 − qst1 (x2 (t) p (x1 (t) + x2 (t))− z2 (t))] ·
· [p (x1 (t) + x2 (t)) + x2 (t) p
′ (x1 (t) + x2 (t))]− c2} (6)
·
z1 (t) = h1 [− (1− q) t1 + qst1 (x1 (t) p (x1 (t) + x2 (t))− z1 (t))]
·
z2 (t) = h2 [− (1− q) t1 + qst1 (x2 (t) p (x1 (t) + x2 (t))− z2 (t))]
xi (0) = xi0, zi (0) = zi0, i = 1, 2.
System (6) has the stationary state (x∗1, x
∗
2, z
∗
1 , z
∗
2) given by (4) .
Let u1 (t) = x1 (t)− x
∗
1, u2 (t) = x2 (t)− x
∗
2, u3 (t) = z1 (t)− z
∗
1 , u4 (t) = z2 (t)− z
∗
2 .
By expanding (6) in a Taylor series around the stationary state (x∗1, x
∗
2, z
∗
1 , z
∗
2) and ne-
glecting the terms of higher order than the first order, we have the following linear approxi-
mation of system (6) :
·
u1 (t) = k1{a10u1 (t) + a01u2 (t) + a001u3 (t)}
·
u2 (t) = k2{b10u1 (t) + b01u2 (t) + b001u4 (t)}
·
u3 (t) = h1{c10u1 (t) + c01u2 (t) + c001u3 (t)} (7)
·
u4 (t) = h2{d10u1 (t) + d01u2 (t) + d001u4 (t)}
where:
a10 = −qst1
c21
(1− t1)
2
+ (1− t1) (2p
′ (x∗1 + x
∗
2) + x
∗
1p
′′ (x∗1 + x
∗
2)) ,
a01 = −qst1x
∗
1p
′ (x∗1 + x
∗
2)
c1
1− t1
+ (1− t1) (p
′ (x∗1 + x
∗
2) + x
∗
1p
′′ (x∗1 + x
∗
2)) ,
a001 =
qst1c1
1− t1
, b001 =
qst1c2
1− t1
, c001 = d001 = −qst1, c10 =
qst1c1
1− t1
, (8)
b10 = −qst1x
∗
2p
′ (x∗1 + x
∗
2)
c2
1− t1
+ (1− t1) (p
′ (x∗1 + x
∗
2) + x
∗
2p
′′ (x∗1 + x
∗
2)) ,
b01 = −qst1
c22
(1− t1)
2
+ (1− t1) (2p
′ (x∗1 + x
∗
2) + x
∗
2p
′′ (x∗1 + x
∗
2)) ,
c01 = qst1x
∗
1p
′ (x∗1 + x
∗
2) , d10 = qst1x
∗
2p
′ (x∗1 + x
∗
2) , d01 = qst1
c2
1− t1
.
5The characteristic equation associated to (7) is given by:
λ4 +m43λ
3 +m42λ
2 +m41λ+m40 = 0 (9)
where:
m43 = −k1a10 − k2b01 − h1c001 − h2d001
m42 = k1k2a10b01 + (k1a10 + k2b01) (h1c001 + h2d001)− h1k1a001c10 −
−k2h2b001d01 + h1h2c001d001 − k1k2a01b10
m41 = k1k2a10b01 (h1c001 − h2d001)− k2h1h2c001d001b01 +
+h1k1c10a001 (k2b01 + h2d001)− k1k2h2b001a01d10 +
+k1k2h2a10b001d01 + k2h1h2b001c001d01 +
+k1k2a01b10 (h2d001 + h1c001)− k1k2h1a001b10c01 (10)
m40 = k1k2h1h2(a10b01c001d001 − a001b01c10d001 + a001b001c10d01 +
+a01b001c001d10 − a001b001c01d10 − a10b001c001d01 +
+a001b10c01d001 − a01b10c001d001).
A necessary and sufficient condition as equation (9) has all roots with negative real part
is given by Routh-Hurwitz criterion:
D1 = m43 > 0, D2 = m43m42 −m41 > 0, D3 = m41D2 −m
2
43m40 > 0, D4 = m41D3 > 0. (11)
From the Routh-Hurwitz criterion we have:
Proposition 3 The stationary state of system (6) is asymptotically stable if and only if
conditions (11) hold.
4 The dynamic model with tax evasion and time delay
In [7] and [8] we have studied the rent seeking games with time delay and distributed
delay. In the present section we analyze the rent seeking games with tax evasion and delay.
For τ = 0 we obtain the model from [3]. For τ = 0 and t1 = 0 we obtain the model from [1].
We consider the model from section 3 where we introduce the time delay τ . We suppose the
first firm is the leader and the second firm is the follower. The follower knows the quantity
of the leader firm, x1 (t− τ) , which entered the market at the moment t− τ, τ > 0.
The differential system which describes this model is given by:
·
x1 (t) = k1{[1− qt1 − qst1 (x1 (t) p (x1 (t) + x2 (t))− z1 (t))] ·
[p (x1 (t) + x2 (t)) + x1 (t) p
′ (x1 (t) + x2 (t))]− c1}
·
x2 (t) = k2{[1− qt1 − qst1 (x2 (t) p (x1 (t− τ) + x2 (t))− z2 (t))] ·
[p (x1 (t− τ) + x2 (t)) + x2 (t) p
′ (x1 (t− τ) + x2 (t))]− c2} (12)
·
z1 (t) = h1 [− (1− q) t1 + qst1 (x1 (t) p (x1 (t) + x2 (t))− z1 (t))]
·
z2 (t) = h2 [− (1− q) t1 + qst1 (x2 (t) p (x1 (t) + x2 (t))− z2 (t))]
x1 (θ) = ϕ (θ) , θ ∈ [−τ, 0] , x2 (0) = x20, zi (0) = zi0, ki > 0, hi > 0, i = 1, 2.
6For p (x) =
1
x
the stationary state of system (12) is given by (4) .
With respect to the transformation u1 (t) = x1 (t) − x
∗
1, u2 (t) = x2 (t) − x
∗
2, u3 (t) =
z1 (t)−z
∗
1 , u4 (t) = z2 (t)−z
∗
2 , and by expanding (12) in a Taylor series around the stationary
state (x∗1, x
∗
2, z
∗
1 , z
∗
2) and neglecting the terms of higher order than the first order, we obtain
the following linear approximation of system (12) :
·
u1 (t) = k1{a10u1 (t) + a01u2 (t) + a001u3 (t)}
·
u2 (t) = k2{b10u1 (t− τ) + b01u2 (t) + b001u4 (t)}
·
u3 (t) = h1{c10u1 (t) + c01u2 (t) + c001u3 (t)} (13)
·
u4 (t) = h2{d10u1 (t) + d01u2 (t) + d001u4 (t)}
where a10, a01, a001, b10, b01, b001, c10, c01, c001, d10, d01, d001, are given by (8) .
The corresponding characteristic equation of (13) is :
λ4 + n43λ
3 + n42λ
2 + n41λ+ n40 + e
−λτ
(
n22λ
2 + n21λ+ n20
)
= 0, (14)
where
n43 = m43, n22 = −k1k2a01b10
n42 = k1k2a10b01 + (k1a10 + k2b01) (h1c001 + h2d001)− h1k1a001c10 −
−k2h2b001d01 + h1h2c001d001
n41 = k1k2a10b01 (h1c001 − h2d001)− k2h1h2c001d001b01 +
+h1k1c10a001 (k2b01 + h2d001)− k1k2h2b001a01d10 +
+k1k2h2a10b001d01 + k2h1h2b001c001d01
n40 = k1k2h1h2(a10b01c001d001 − a001b01c10d001 + a001b001c10d01 +
+a01b001c001d10 − a001b001c01d10 − a10b001c001d01)
n21 = k1k2a01b10 (h2d001 + h1c001)− k1k2h1a001b10c01
n20 = k1k2h1h2(a001b10c01d001 − a01b10c001d001).
The roots of (14) depend on τ. Considering τ as parameter, we determine τ0 so that
λ = iω is a root of (14) . Substituting λ = iω into equation (14) we obtain:
ω4 − in43ω
3 − n42ω
2 + in41ω + n40 +
(
−n22ω
2 + in21ω + n20
)
(cosωτ − isinωτ) = 0.
From the above equation we have:
ω8 + r6ω
6 + r4ω
4 + r2ω
2 + r0 = 0 (15)
where
r6 = n
2
43 − 2n42, r4 = n
2
42 + 2n40 − 2n43n41 − n
2
22,
r2 = n
2
41 − 2n42n40 + 2n22n20 − n
2
21, r0 = n
2
40 − n
2
20.
If ω0 is a positive root of (15) then there is a Hopf bifurcation and the value of τ0 is
given by:
τ0 =
1
ω0
arctg
a1a4ω0 + a2a3
−a1a3 + a2a4ω0
, (16)
where a1 = ω
4
0 − n42ω
2
0 + n40, a2 = −n43ω
3
0 + n41ω0, a3 = n22ω
2
0 − n20, a4 = n21ω0.
We can conclude with the following theorem:
7Theorem 4 (i) If ω0 is a positive root of (15) and Re(
dλ
dτ
)λ=iω0,τ=τ0 6= 0, where τ0 is given
by (16), then a Hopf bifurcation occurs at the stationary state (x∗1, x
∗
2, z
∗
1 , z
∗
2) as τ passes
through τ0.
(ii) If conditions (11) hold and n0 > 0, then the stationary state is asymptotically stable
for any τ > 0.
5 Numerical simulation
For the numerical simulation we use Maple 11 and the following data: q = 0.3, s = 40,
t1 = 0.16, c1 = 0.2, c2 = 2, k1 = 0.05, k2 = 0.01, h1 = 0.05, h2 = 0.01. The stationary state
is: x∗1 = 0.34710, x
∗
2 = 0.0347, z
∗
1 = 0.85075, z
∗
2 = 0.03257.
For τ = 0 the Routh-Hurwicz conditions are satisfied. Then, the stationary state is
stable.
The positive solution of (15) is ω0 = 0.010083 and τ0 = 164.5979. For τ ∈ (0, τ0) the
stationary state is asymptotically stable and for τ ∈ [τ0,∞) the stationary state is unstable.
For τ = τ0 there is a Hopf bifurcation.
For q = 0.3, s = 40, t1 = 0.16, c1 = 0.2, c2 = 1.5, k1 = 0.05, k2 = 0.01, h1 = 0.05, h2 =
0.01. The stationary state is: x∗1 = 0.4359, x
∗
2 = 0.05813, z
∗
1 = 0.824019, z
∗
2 = 0.059313.
For τ = 0 the Routh-Hurwicz conditions are satisfied. Then, the stationary state is
stable.
The equation (15) has no positive root. Then, the stationary state is asymptotically
stable for any τ > 0.
6 Conclusions
In the static model with tax evasion, the parameters q and s characterize the behavior
of the firms with respect to evasion. The presented figures allow the analysis of the declared
revenues and the profits with respect to s.
For the dynamic model with tax evasion, using Routh-Hurwitz criterion we have deter-
mined the conditions for which the stationary state is asymptotically stable.
For the dynamic model with tax evasion and time delay, using the delay τ as a bifurcation
parameter we have shown that a Hopf bifurcation occurs when τ passes through a critical
value τ0.
The direction of the Hopf bifurcation, the stability and the period of the bifurcating
periodic solutions will be analyzed in a future paper.
The findings of the present paper can be extended in an oligopoly case.
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